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THE NEGLECT OF AFRICA AND THE 
POWER OF AID
Suzanne Franks
Abstract / Since the end of colonial rule, Africa has on the whole been inadequately covered by
the western media. It is rarely reported except as a backdrop to disaster or as the scene of a celebrity
visit. There is an absence of sustained and well-informed reporting about Africa in the mainstream
media. And when the media do cover it they often get the story very wrong, partly because there
is no ongoing understanding of and engagement with the continent. Using exclusive access to the
BBC archive, the article examines how and why media coverage of Africa has been misleading and
misinformed in the postcolonial period. It examines the extent to which the close relationship
between media coverage and aid agencies has damaged the cause of informing the public. Aid
agencies have seen a huge growth since the mid-1980s – partly precipitated by the power of media
imagery. As media organizations have reduced their commitment to investing in reporting on Africa
so journalists have in turn become more dependent upon aid agencies, which have filled a vacuum.
This symbiotic relationship requires a degree of transparency otherwise there is a danger that it can
compromise journalistic accountability.
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The compelling book by Joris Luyendijk, Het zijn net mensen. Beelden van het
Midden-Oosten [People Like Us: The Truth about Reporting the Middle East] (2006)
contributes a whole new dimension to the manner in which we interpret foreign
news reporting. It demonstrates a recurring series of paradoxes about the way that
the media covers and explains international news. It also exposes the paradigms
that journalists use to construct our understanding of other places. The observa-
tions Luyendijk makes are especially pertinent when we are considering stories from
very faraway places, where the media are in most cases the only available source
that audiences have to understand a difficult, complicated and remote location. And
nowhere is this lack of comprehension more evident than in the reporting of Africa
– that most misunderstood of continents.
An interesting counterpoint to Luyendijk is another account which highlights
some of the contemporary paradoxes of reporting Africa; the bestselling book Blood
River by the Daily Telegraph journalist, Tim Butcher (2007). He sought to follow the
historic journey of an earlier Telegraph correspondent, Henry Stanley, the 19th-century
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hero who uncovered Dr Livingstone, and traced the course of the Congo river. What
Butcher discovered is that travelling across the country that now calls itself the
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2004 was in many ways more difficult and danger-
ous than the same journey would have been in the period following 1875. Again
and again he observes that history in this part of the world has in a sense ‘moved
backwards’ (Butcher’s words). Grandfathers are more likely to have gone to school,
travelled on trains and experienced urban amenities than their grandchildren. Yet
not only is daily life more rudimentary and also more dangerous in this country that
is so well endowed with natural resources, Butcher also demonstrates a further para-
dox: how despite the technological advances that enable us to access the remotest
places, many parts of Africa are less understood and less well reported in this period
than they were several generations ago. We may have access to sophisticated satel-
lite communications that enable reporters to broadcast live or to file stories from the
middle of a desert or a jungle, but that has not led to equivalent understanding and
explanation of what is happening in remote and faraway places.
In the colonial period, when Henry Stanley was reporting, Africa mattered to the
European powers. Denis Wu has illustrated the role of economic interaction as an
important indicator in the range and extent of foreign reporting (Wu, 2003). Colonial
powers had much at stake, economically and politically, and as a result of this, news
from Africa was more comprehensively covered by journalists. Even middle-market
UK newspapers had full-time locally based Africa correspondents who showed a
real understanding and context of the places they lived in and were reporting on
an incremental basis. Serious reporting of Africa carried on during the immediate
postcolonial period. From the 1960s, the colonial paradigm as a means of under-
standing Africa was replaced by the Cold War. As an important location in the proxy
war between the two great powers, Africa continued to matter a great deal to
western audiences, so there was still informed and engaged reporting about what
was happening there.
Today Africa no longer matters as a colonial or a Cold War story, but has in
many cases been reduced to a series of journalistic stereotypes (Franks, 2005). It is
commonly a location for inexplicable ethnic wars and assorted disasters or celebrity
visits. There is little engagement with the ongoing politics, hence the frequent refer-
ence to the category of tribe rather than explanations about political power struc-
tures. This kind of interpretation happens because the journalism tends to be episodic
rather than the incremental, regular reporting which depends upon a regular pre-
sence on the ground. Instead of a network of locally based correspondents, many
news organizations now rely on what is called ‘parachute journalism’ in their
coverage of Africa (Pawson, 2007). The series of disasters which so much of African
news consists of are covered by journalists who are flown in from newsrooms in
the West, complete with all the latest communications equipment. In a 24-hour
media market these so-called ‘dish monkeys’ are expected to perform quickly and
the reporting is necessarily superficial and frequently full of stereotypes. The Kenyan
writer Binyamin Wainana published an illuminating article in Granta magazine,
‘How to Write About Africa’, which poured scorn on the typical depictions of the
continent in western publications:
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Never have a picture of a well-adjusted African on the cover . . . unless that African has won
the Nobel Prize. An AK-47, prominent ribs, naked breasts – use these. . . . Treat Africa as if it
were one country. It is hot and dusty with rolling grasslands and huge herds of animals and
tall, thin people who are starving. . . . African characters should be colourful, exotic, larger
than life – but empty inside with no dialogue. (Wainaina, 2005)
The article continues in this vein pointing to the recurring clichés and stereotypes
employed in the way that stories about Africa are covered, which other journalists
have referred to as ‘the National Geographic syndrome’. The critical message is so
effective that the article became the most copied and reprinted feature that Granta
had ever published.
In fact, the observations that Wainaina makes can be taken much further. It is
not simply that the stories about Africa are tired clichés but that sometimes they
are also wildly inaccurate. In other cases stories are omitted or ignored as they do
not fit the stereotype or because the location is Africa, somewhere that is regarded
as a setting apart from normal life. A gross example of this misreporting happened
in the coverage of the refugee camps in the Great Lakes area in the aftermath of
the Rwanda genocide, in 1994. The murderous killing spree of almost a million
people (Tutsis and some moderate Hutus) by the Hutu majority had been ignored by
most of the foreign media (Mackintosh, 1996). One reason was that it happened at
the same time as the installation of the new democratic government in South Africa
and the feeling in newsrooms was that one story at a time from Africa was enough.
And the powerful story of the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as president was
significantly a very rare good news story out of Africa – so when the genocide
commenced, all suitable expertise was busy in Johannesburg.
The ignorance of what had happened in Rwanda was compounded weeks later
when the Interhamwe Hutu killers arrived in the camps in eastern Zaire. By then the
elections were over in South Africa so there was an unseemly rush by both jour-
nalists and aid agencies to places like Goma to tell terrible tales about poor refugees
and their suffering. For days there were misleading reports where many of the jour-
nalists, who knew little about the background, missed the point that the camps
were not ministering to fleeing victims of the slaughter, but full of the recent killers
and their relatives. George Alagiah covered this story for the BBC. He admitted later
that for a whole week when he first reached Zaire he was in effect misleading the
audience and he had ‘lost the plot’ (Alagiah, 2001: 120) and was inadvertently telling
the wrong story. Alagiah is no more to blame than the rest of the western media in
failing to understand what was going on. It took some time before the scale of the
misrepresentation gradually emerged. Both David Rieff and Fiona Terry have written
extensively about the way that the story of the refugee camps was misinterpreted
(Rieff, 2002; Terry, 2002).
According to some observers much media reporting of Africa has hardly moved
on from Stanley’s image of the dark continent! (Hultman, 1992). This scandalous
level of misinformation evident in the reporting of the Zaire refugee crisis would be
unthinkable in most other parts of the world, but in Africa there is a sense that it
is all too complicated to understand and probably caused by some ancient tribal
rivalries (Allen and Seaton, 1999: Introduction).1 In the intervening years these
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‘missing stories’ have been compounded. The fighting in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo in the late 1990s, which was part of the fall-out from Rwanda, even-
tually claimed some estimated 4 million lives in a continuing war of attrition – the
highest death toll in any single war since 1945, yet for western purposes it has been
largely invisible.
The long-running Congo war has sometimes been called ‘Africa’s hidden first
world war’ (Benn, 2004), because as far as the rest of the world is concerned it is
hardly ever reported, despite the enormous death toll. ‘The Congo war is so complex
– involving the armies of six neighbouring states and an array of dubious mining
interests that it never caught the public imagination’ (Philps, 2007: 67). Even in 2007,
five years after there was supposedly a peace agreement in the Congo thousands
were still dying in the fighting – more than in the Darfur crisis that was happening
at the same time. Similarly, the fighting in northern Uganda where over a million
people were displaced into camps because of the activities of the Lord’s Resistance
Army – probably one of the biggest population displacements in the world at that
time – rarely registered in international news coverage (Allen, 2006). Yet if it had
happened elsewhere it is difficult to argue that there would not have been more
widespread interest and concern.
On some occasions this double standard about what is newsworthy has led to
bizarre extremes, verging on a form of racism. For example in 1977/8 there was a
rebellion by local gendarmes in the mining area of Shaba (formerly Katanga)
province of southern Zaire. The dictator of Zaire, Mobutu Setse Seko, whose govern-
ment was threatened by the rebellion, put a clever spin on the story claiming that
white miners and their families based in the area were facing danger, recalling
memories of the fate of the Europeans in the Congo crisis of 1960. This alert
prompted the Belgians to send in an airlift with accompanying troops, whose
presence on the ground ultimately saved Mobutu’s government. However the media
reaction to the supposed threat to white civilians was overwhelming. Associated
Press called the rebels’ campaign ‘a rampage of murder and rape’ while United Press
International dubbed it ‘a frenzy of killing and looting’, characterizations based on
government press releases which later proved to be largely incorrect.
The BBC sent a total of five correspondents to the area to cover the story of
the whites (apparently) under siege, including Clive Small, who had by then left his
post as a correspondent in Africa and was specially recalled.2 In the end, very few
whites were killed in the unrest and the victims were overwhelmingly black. But
such were the unambiguous racist attitudes in the saturation coverage of a rela-
tively small incident that there were later complaints within the BBC, and the inter-
national press produced editorials on the double standards of the scale and nature
of the coverage.3 The distorted attention paid to the Shaba rebellion gives a clear
indication of the disproportionate weight accorded to African stories involving whites
(Hultman, 1992). It reinforces the notion that as a rule if a story was only about
black Africans there was considerably less interest. As Graham Mytton observed in
his internal BBC report on the coverage, ‘we change our news values when the lives
of white people are at stake’.4
So Africa is ignored or misreported and when it is mentioned, then horror and
disaster are the regular themes. ‘Normal’ stories about business or cosmopolitan city
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life in Africa rarely feature in western coverage of Africa (Gault, 2007). Instead there
is a recurring template of bad news from Africa and often this is told in a random
way so that there is little engagement with the underlying politics. Richard Dowden
refers to this pattern as the ‘New Orleans syndrome’ (Dowden, 2008). When Hurri-
cane Katrina hit the Louisiana coast and caused devastation in 2005, this did not
become the exclusive identity of New Orleans – as a place of flooding and disaster.
This is because audiences and readers have accumulated plenty of other images of
New Orleans – associations with music, with holidays and altogether an interesting
and diverse location. In contrast many African locations are only known through
their disaster coverage. There are rarely ‘normal’ images of everyday life, for example
in countries such as Ethiopia or Sudan, which could offer a counterbalance or alter-
native to the dominant image of famine.
This default pattern of bad news from Africa is what made the coverage of
Mandela and the new South Africa in 1994 so unusual and exceptional. In contrast
to that, the BBC journalist George Alagiah, speaking at the Dispatches from Disaster
zones conference in 1998, outlined a grim template for the way that African stories
are so frequently framed. He pointed to the key requirements for a standard story
from Africa – first the image of a starving child, then a feeding centre complete
with a woman with shrunken breasts, next is an aid worker (preferably a white
woman) battling against the odds and finally a reporter summing up how terrible
it all is (Clark, 2004: 699) This is the standard Africa paradigm for western audi-
ences. Those occasions since the Cold War when there has been reporting that is
more politically engaged and properly nuanced tend to be stories which are a
leftover from colonial times, such as the plight of the white farmers in Zimbabwe
or the twilight of Apartheid in South Africa or incidents like the Shaba rebellion.
Meanwhile stories about African countries and societies which do not have a former
colonial or obviously ‘white’ angle tend to be less comprehensively reported and
explained. The post-election unrest in Kenya, for example, at the start of 2008 was
not explained in a nuanced or well-rounded fashion for western audiences but as
a simple tribal/ethnic clash, instead of a political confrontation as it would have been
framed in a developed country (Manji, 2008).
Telling Stories about Aid
Alagiah’s characterization of the template of a typical African story highlights another
common feature of contemporary reporting, which is the central role of humanitar-
ian aid agencies in interpreting the way that much of the continent is understood
and framed for western audiences. There is now a close and significant relationship
between much journalism and the aid community, which has important implications
for the way that Africa is explained to the rest of the world. NGOs are highly attuned
to the need for the right kind of media attention. It was the founder of Médecins
sans Frontières (MSF) and currently the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner,
who famously and farsightedly said at the time of the Biafra crisis that ‘where there
is no camera, there is no humanitarian intervention’ (Cate, 2002: 5).
Since Kouchner founded MSF, there has been a total sea-change in the role
and scale of aid agencies over the past 40 years and this in turn has had a crucial
FRANKS: THE NEGLECT OF AFRICA 75
effect upon the reporting of Africa. The media in fact have played a key part in this
growth and expansion. In the 1980s, especially in the wake of the Ethiopian famine
and the subsequent Band Aid/Live Aid phenomenon, a number of NGOs doubled
and trebled in size in response to the fundraising campaigns, which were largely
media inspired. Since the 1980s there has also been, for several reasons, a growing
tendency for governments to devolve some of their aid efforts to the third sector. At
the same time there was a gradual shift in funding away from long-term develop-
ment support towards emergency aid, which was in turn channelled increasingly
through NGOs. Already in 1976 Henry Kissinger had observed how significant emer-
gency relief was to western governments, when he commented that ‘Disaster Relief
is becoming increasingly a major instrument of our foreign policy’ (Kent, 1987: 81).
In the wake of the Ethiopian famine the development writer Alex de Waal put this
rather more bluntly: ‘For Western governments the political priority became to avoid
embarrassment at the hands of figures like Bob Geldof. Aid became a strategic alibi’
(de Waal, 1997: 12).
Humanitarian intervention was developing into an important political tool and
the role of agencies who provided the aid was also becoming far more prominent.
Against this background, the promotion and marketing of the NGOs as large multi-
national organizations was also gaining importance and in turn the relationships
between the agencies and the media were taking on a new significance. At the
most basic level, there was a keen awareness of the role of news coverage in raising
awareness and bringing in funding. There is little argument that the volume of aid
which a crisis attracts is closely linked to the scale of media coverage, not neces-
sarily the level of need. NGOs know only too well that disaster fundraising follows
the news agenda. There are countless instances where a media campaign has had
an overwhelming influence in raising money for a particular crisis and conversely
where the absence of media coverage has meant only limited funds. For example,
in 2005, amid a serious food crisis in Niger the UN launched an appeal for US$16
million in the middle of May. Two months later barely US$3 million had been pledged.
Then the BBC sent a reporter to cover the story and there were shots on the main
TV bulletins of babies in feeding stations, distressed mothers and anxious aid
workers. Within a week the UN target had been exceeded.
Tony Vaux, who once worked for Oxfam and now writes about NGOs, remarks
that ‘you either have an aid bonanza or you have nothing’ and he compares the
distribution of fundraising to a ‘roulette wheel . . . suddenly a particular number
comes up and there is wide scale media exposure and the disaster will become high
profile and a money spinner’.5 This is the result of what is known in the aid com-
munity as a ‘noisy emergency’: the crises which ‘attract a storm of media attention,
a high proportion of official donors funds, generous private donations which leave
. . . so many “silent emergencies” and the millions trying to survive them, in the
shadows’ (Humanitarian Practice Network, 2002: 1).
A classic example emerged in the contrast in fundraising for the Mozambique
floods in 2000, compared with the cyclone and flooding in the Indian state of Orissa,
just a few months earlier (Olsen et al., 2003). The Indian disaster was more damaging
and killed more victims, but there was very limited media coverage, partly due to
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the attitude of the Indian government on that occasion. Meanwhile the Mozambique
crisis produced dramatic media images, in particular helicopters rescuing people from
the tops of trees. Its climax was the remarkable rescue of a woman giving birth by
a passing South African helicopter.
A UK Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) joint charitable appeal for Mozam-
bique, launched in March 2000, raised over £30 million – at that point the third
highest total for any of their broadcasts. Meanwhile an appeal for the crisis in Orissa
raised a mere £7 million. Moreover the Orissa flood happened first, which would
suggest that there might have been a sense of déjà vu by the time the Mozambique
appeal took place. And the Orissa appeal was in late 1999, during the comparatively
‘fruitful’ Christmas period, when charitable donations are traditionally more forth-
coming. Yet clearly other reasons led to the Mozambique appeal yielding a higher
level of donations. The images are critical in inspiring assistance.
However, an interesting contrast with the Orissa appeal occurred a year later
when a devastating earthquake affected the state of Gujarat in northwest India.
Once again the Indian government said that it would accept charitable donations and
an appeal was launched by the DEC in February 2001. Tony Vaux wrote an assess-
ment of the Gujarat appeal contrasting the response to the two Indian disasters, the
Gujarat earthquake with the Orissa floods. There was far greater television and media
coverage of the earthquake and the public response in the UK was correspondingly
over three times greater than for the flooding. The DEC appeal for Gujarat raised
£24 million. Although the UK has closer links with Gujarat than Orissa, it is still hard
to explain this discrepancy, except through the images. According to Vaux, the
response to different disasters is so variable not because of any objective reason
‘but simply a subjective response to selected images’.
In May 2008 there were similar discrepancies between the responses to two
different disasters which occurred within weeks of each other: the Sechuan earth-
quake and cyclone Nargis in Burma. The Chinese, in contrast to all previous expec-
tations, allowed full and frank media coverage in the immediate wake of the
devastation. There were remarkable pictures and great stories of plucky heroes
rescuing victims, the Beijing government basked in sympathy and the international
aid flowed in. Meanwhile, the Burmese disaster resulted in a higher death toll, but
the media coverage was tightly restricted and especially in the early period there
were few pictures of the disaster and the relief effort. Moreover the stories that did
emerge were about the frustration of the NGOs at dealing with the Burmese regime.
As a result, the fundraising suffered. Several weeks after the cyclone struck, the
DEC appeal had raised only £8 million and by late July the total was £15 million.
This might seem a respectable amount, but it is disappointing given that almost a
hundred thousand people lost their lives, many more were made homeless and it
is only a fraction of what was raised for the Pakistan earthquake in 2006, which
again had much more extensive media coverage, despite its remote location. As a
frustrated Red Cross official remarked in response to the Burma crisis, ‘If the media
isn’t telling the story that there is a need and . . . that there is a way that the public
can take action to address this need . . . then fundraising simply isn’t going to
happen’ (Franks, 2008: 30).
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Media coverage is also critical in the way that an individual agency can promote
itself against the opposition. In a crowded market agencies jostle for position and
in some crises this competitive branding reaches extraordinary levels. For example,
in the aftermath of the Rwanda crisis in 1994 the displays of logos in the refugee
camps in Goma apparently looked like a trip down Oxford St as nearly 200 differ-
ent NGOs struggled to make their mark in front of the cameras. And according to
observers, the same rivalry for attention took place at the nightly press conferences.6
Similar accusations of competitive posturing for the benefit of the media
coverage were also made in follow-up assessments of other prominent relief oper-
ations. In 2001, the DEC published an evaluation they had commissioned into the
Gujarat earthquake, which again raised many of these same issues (DEC, 2002). It
made the criticism that DEC members were more ‘fund driven’ than ‘need driven’
in their response and therefore ‘became victims of their organisation’s fundraising
success’. The report asserted that ‘there is an underlying problem that funds are
skewed disproportionately towards situations of high media profile rather than
actual need’ and questioned ‘whether agencies allow the desire for publicity . . . to
outweigh humanitarian principles’. Four years later, the same themes reoccurred in
the initial DEC evaluation of the response to the Asian tsunami.7 This was very
damning in some places and in fact the original report which was so critical of inter-
agency rivalry and unnecessary media profile that it was not even made public. BBC’s
Newsnight obtained a leaked copy, which included references to ‘concern about
the proliferation of signboards and the tendency to mark every item with the agency’s
name’ and reference to ‘a few cases where relief flights seem to have been used
more for public profile than because of real need’.
At the most basic level, disasters which are sudden and unexpected and there-
fore usually newsworthy are in many cases good news for NGOs. If the media
coverage works then they give a sudden and immense boost to the profile and
income of the organization. International development and aid charities generally do
well from disasters. Hilary Blume of the Charity Advisory Trust observed this process
during the 2004 Asian tsunami disaster:
I watched the BBC TV coverage with increasing distaste as the spokesmen from the large aid
charities relished their 15 minutes of fame and got their fund raising campaigns under way. I
was reminded of working for a UK aid charity 35 years before when the management hoped
for a disaster to secure their finances. (Blume, 2005: 45)
The incremental and frequently unsung world of development does not often
attract sudden or vast donations (with the exception of Bill Gates!). It is hard to focus
attention and direct resources for a chronic ongoing problem. Emergencies on the
other hand, if they capture the media, can bring in enormous funds quite rapidly. The
refugee crisis during August 1994 in Goma in the wake of the Rwandan genocide
precipitated a 500 percent increase in NGO income over that period. Michael Maren,
who has written about of his experiences as an aid worker, describes with some
cynicism the way that NGOs seize upon ‘growth opportunities’ when disaster strikes
(Maren, 1997: 263).
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UGC and the Quid Pro Quo
This pattern of dependence upon media coverage (and sudden disasters) as a central
part of an NGO’s fundraising strategy is a recurring and familiar one. What is less
obvious is the mutual dependence of journalism upon the aid agencies and the
impact that this in turn has upon news gathering. A period of tighter foreign news
budgets has coincided with the transformation and growth of aid agencies into
increasingly powerful global institutions. In many African countries they have a high
visibility and significant resources. The aid workers in their land rovers are a familiar
part of the landscape. If a journalist cannot persuade the news desk to provide
logistic support in order to cover a difficult story, then often the NGO will be happy
to step in. It can organize transport and offer access to local resources on the ground
as well as helpful briefings with their staff. A reporter who is parachuting in and needs
to file a story within hours may be indebted to the NGO staff who are locally based
and able to offer invaluable insights. This kind of back-up is even more important
for freelancers and stringers, who frequently find it impossible to cover these types
of story without the practical support of local aid workers.
In some places, reporters covering humanitarian crises are effectively embedded
with aid agencies, which may entail similar trade-offs to going on location with the
military. Indeed, some journalists and editors have become wary of accepting any
support from aid agencies because they fear the consequences of being compro-
mised by such close ties. Yet in many cases where funds are limited or where the
NGO is the only source of support in an inhospitable area, there may be little alter-
native. When Michael Buerk filmed his world famous reports for the BBC on the
Ethiopian famine in 1984, he only reached Tigray in the first place because of a plane
provided by the NGO World Vision. In view of the ongoing civil war, no commer-
cial airliner was prepared to fly there from Addis Ababa because of the fighting on
the ground. At that time World Vision was quite a controversial agency, which many
suspected was linked to the CIA.8 But despite misgivings by editorial staff about the
compromises entailed by such arrangements, the BBC had little choice but to accept
the World Vision offer if they wanted to reach the story.9 Following transmission,
World Vision complained to the BBC that their contribution had not been given
sufficient credit in the news reports!10 This tension between the aid agency seeking
to maximize its returns from helping journalists and the media organization is not
unusual. If foreign news budgets continue to shrink while humanitarian aid organi-
zations become more influential, this dynamic will not change.
The growing media sophistication of NGOs has led to further refinements in
the way that they seek to help journalists – and thereby reap a PR reward. As the
resources for news have declined, large and well-funded agencies have embraced
the new world of user generated content (UGC) and sought to substitute their own
material for independent reporting (Cooper, 2007). They will send out expertly
trained staff (some of them former journalists) to produce edited packages which
are then offered to mainstream news programmes. During the Burmese crisis in
2008 when there was eventually some media access, it was the aid agency Merlin
which managed to send its people in to film and the results appeared on BBC TV
news. On other occasions, a close reading of the newspaper byline might reflect
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that the ‘reporter on the ground’ is actually an employee of a particular aid agency.
At first sight this may seem a neat solution where both the NGO and the journal-
istic outlet can fulfil their objectives, but sometimes things may become confused.
In one difficult case of UGC, Médecins Sans Frontières hired a cameraman and
filmed a piece during a humanitarian crisis in Haiti during 2006. They passed the
material on to ITN who ran it on their bulletin with no credit, even referring in the
commentary to the work of ‘our cameraman’. The agency was pleased to have put
its message (and its brand) across, in a manner that looked completely independent.
Meanwhile, the broadcaster, by using a report paid for and filmed by someone else,
had minimized its outgoings (Cooper, 2007). The problem is that the public was
misled. Even if there are proper credits, as there were in the Burma example, there
is still a question about the provenance of such material. The aid agency wants a
return on its investment and the report is hardly likely to give anything other than
a fulsome account of its activities in the field.
This symbiosis of media and aid agencies, while it might benefit both parties,
may not always best serve the audience. Just like other large institutions, aid agencies
and their activities in the field should be held to account by effective journalism.
But if lines are blurred this may not happen. When aid organizations were small and
well-meaning amateur outfits there was a sense that they were simply trying to
make the world a better place and deserved to be treated as worthwhile causes
inspired by well-meaning individuals above suspicion. Today, many aid campaigns
are substantial global operations and it is in the public interest that they are reported
impartially. If journalists and aid workers embrace each other too tightly this is
unlikely to happen.
Mixed Messages
There is still a huge amount of public trust invested in humanitarian aid agencies,
even though these days some of them may be large, quasi-corporate organizations.
The public are surprisingly prepared to donate with only the vaguest idea of what the
money will be used for and with only limited accountability. Ed Miliband as minister
for the third sector remarked ruefully on the wide contrast in public trust between
NGOs and political parties (Miliband, 2007). This attitude of aid agencies as ‘sacred
cows’ has extended into journalism, which often suspends its normal habits of
scrutiny and questioning when considering the objectives and implementation of
aid effort. If the reporting follows the NGO agenda, then there is a danger that
understanding will be compromised. The consequences of journalism which is not
sufficiently dispassionate about the goals of aid can be seen in a number of histor-
ical episodes.
In retrospect, the Biafra crisis in 1968–9 was far from what it seemed at the time.
The media account of the crisis focused upon a terrible famine. There were shocking
pictures which caused outrage in the West and prompted calls for support to the
victims suffering in the rebel province of Biafra. The aid agencies which helped
the Biafrans were seen as angels of mercy aiding the starving victims. Then it later
emerged that through their support the agencies were helping to feed the rebel
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troops. They were providing a valuable (and in fact the sole) source of foreign currency
to the rebel government and thereby propping up a doomed and isolated regime,
which was bound eventually to collapse to the Nigerians. The effect of the aid effort
was to bring in additional arms to Biafra and the result of the influx of money and
weapons was that the war and thereby the suffering to the civilian population lasted
much longer than necessary. It took many years before it was evident that the aid
effort and contemporary reporting of the war were tragically misleading (Barrow
and Jenkins, 2001). This was largely due to the absence of any understanding that
aid often cannot take place in a ‘neutral space’ and that intervening is itself a poli-
tical act. This is the problem which has on many occasions confronted humanitari-
anism in what are known as complex emergencies.
As far as the media reporting and the aid agencies are concerned, a simple
straightforward narrative is desirable. That is more likely to engage viewers or
readers and to attract funding. Yet the reality in Biafra (and many other places) was
that the problem was a complicated combination of warfare and natural causes and
the provision of help to a suffering population was not a simple apolitical gesture.
The Ethiopian relief effort in 1984/5 was an even higher profile story than Biafra.
Again it was reported as a straightforward famine, caused by lack of rain which
could be relieved by food and assistance from developed countries. Yet the reality
was very different. The famine was not in fact a ‘natural disaster’ as it was portrayed,
but the consequence of an ongoing civil war and a brutal regime which sought to
punish civilians in what it perceived as rebel territories. Food was available, but it
was not reaching the vulnerable. For NGOs the simple story of a natural disaster
caused by lack of rain was far preferable to explaining the origins of a complicated
human-made insurgency. And the vast majority of the media were quite content to
comply with this neat and tidy explanation of starvation caused by failing crops and
drought.
When the aid finally arrived from the well-intentioned western agencies, a sub-
stantial amount was impounded by the Ethiopian government and used in lieu of
payment to their conscripted soldiers, later known as the ‘wheat militias’.11 In other
cases, food aid was used as bait in a mass forced resettlement programme to
relocate the troublesome rebel populations (Africa Watch, 1991). Yet very little of
this story was ever told at the time because it did not suit the purposes of either
the aid agencies or the media, which was instead caught up in the fabulous fund-
raising quest of Bob Geldof and the Band Aid movement that had done wonders
to change perceptions about charity in western countries. This was one of the rare
occasions when news about black Africans made headlines throughout the media,
including popular television and tabloid newspapers. The problem was that the
story, partly because it was so intertwined with the aid agencies, had been distorted
and misinterpreted beyond recognition (Article 19, 1990).
Conclusion
The inadequate reporting of Biafra and Ethiopia has been repeated in journalism
about Africa in subsequent years. Luyendijk’s conclusions about foreign news
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reporting have powerful resonance in the case of Africa and the lack of rounded
and enquiring coverage. Contemporary news about Africa is very largely about
sudden disasters. There is an overwhelming need for more depth and understanding
in much of the way that we report news about Africa, enabling audiences to move
beyond the rigid stereotypes. The dearth of detailed and regular reporting in western
news outlets is exacerbated by the overall cutbacks in foreign news reporting. Africa
is expensive and complicated to report, but beyond this there has been a declining
interest in the continent, as compared to the colonial period and the Cold War era.
Much of the reporting of Africa which does occur originates from within the
framework of aid and is facilitated by aid organizations. This happens both on a
practical level for economic reasons but also on an editorial level. Journalists without
local knowledge who are unfamiliar with a story or location may depend unduly
upon helpful aid agencies. However, at the same time, the coverage of the aid story
requires proper analysis and independent scrutiny. This is particularly important in
Africa where aid agencies (who naturally have their own agendas) continue to play
such a significant role in civil society. As NGOs expand their scope and range there
is a need for international audiences to hold international institutions to account.
At the very least, there is a need for transparency and clarity in this relationship
between the media and foreign aid NGOs. If the journalism is too entwined with
the aid agenda then the ways that we understand and interpret Africa will be further
compromised.
Notes
1. See also ‘If it’s Africa, it Must be a Tribe’, Africa News Service editorial, 1 December 1990, at:
allafrica.com/stories/200101080391.html (accessed 12 May 2007).
2. Interview Graham Mytton, Africa producer BBC World Service. He also produced a detailed
internal report for the BBC after the Shaba incident complaining at the biased coverage and
the overreaction due to the apparent (but unproved) threat to white Europeans. The report
quotes an Evening Standard editorial (22 May 1978) and an interview by Stephen Jessell on
Radio 4’s The World Tonight (29 May 1978), which drew similar conclusions, after the event,
that the reporting was distorted and placed far too much emphasis upon the fate of the whites.
3. The New York Times (27 May 1978) ‘Zaire Killings: Despite Black Toll Zaire Killings Viewed as
White Bloodbath’ and The Washington Post (28 May 1978) ‘Figures Got a Political Twist’.
4. Graham Mytton ‘BBC External Services and the Shaba Story’, internal BBC report, see note 2.
5. Interview with Tony Vaux, as quoted in Franks (2007).
6. Richard Dowden speaking at ‘War Reporting in Africa’ Seminar at St Anthony’s College Oxford
(4 November 2004).
7. ‘Independent Evaluation of the DEC Tsunami Crisis Response’, December 2005 is available at
www.dec.org.uk. The original, very frank evaluation was soon removed from the DEC website
and replaced by a more anodyne version, but details of the original and more critical report
were featured on BBC’s Newsnight ‘Tsunami Report: Before and After’ transmitted 12 January
2006.
8. BBC Written Archive Centre: Minutes of Television Weekly Programme Review 3 April 1985
discussing the programme African Calvary, which was sponsored by World Vision.
9. Interview with Chris Cramer foreign editor BBC TV news in Franks (2007).
10. BBC Written Archive Centre: News and Current Affairs weekly meeting 6 November 1984,
Minute 427.
11. Interview with Dawit Giorgis (Ethiopian relief minister who later defected to the West) shown
on The Hunger Business Channel 4, two-part series November 2000, and BBC Monitoring
Summary of World Broadcasts ME 7788 (31 October 1984) reports on ‘wheat aid’ given to
the troops.
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